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Social Policy and Practice in the Commons1
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University
In The Commons: New Perspectives on Nonprofit Organization, Voluntary
Action and Philanthropy, (Jossey-Bass, 1992) I set forth a theoretical
interpretation of the essential characteristics of nonprofit organization,
voluntary action and philanthropy – the wider third sector. In that work, a
commons is defined as a social grouping characterized by uncoerced
voluntary participation, shared purposes and resources and a sense of
mutuality and fairness. This category reaches beyond the culture-bound
nonprofit sector to include such related phenomena as political parties,
festivals, religious pilgrimages and self-help and mutual aid groups along
with traditional voluntary sector social agencies. Excluded are
entrepreneurial and commercial nonprofit service vendors lacking extensive
board, committee or volunteer participation.
The perspective of the commons is the central anchor point of this paper,
which seeks to: 1) step apart from the assumptions and viewpoints of
utilitarian, rationalist and social structural interpretations of practice and
policy in the third sector and 2) affirm and redirect a line of discussion and
research on practice and policy questions affecting the sector within the
broad perspective variously identified as dialogical, interactive, interpretive
or pragmatic. For easy of understanding, I shall refer to variations in this
broad view in what follows as the pragmatic perspectives.

Pragmatic Perspectives
Pragmatic perspectives are, in all essentials, part of a long-standing tradition
of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and philanthropic studies. The
essentials of pragmatism, or the problem-solving perspective from a policy and
practice standpoint, include emphasis upon the evaluation of action in terms of
the consequences of acts; emphasis on the parallel between the scientific method
and democratic decision processes; and explicit rejection of dualism, particularly
as it supports different approaches to resolving factual and value problems, the
selection of means and ends, and the radical distinction of methods of
understanding what “is” and what “ought to be”.
At least from the time of John Dewey, pragmatic problem-solving models
have been important approaches to practice issues in groups, voluntary action,
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and related questions. This same perspective figures importantly in a number of
organizational, management, planning and policy models. The emphasis on
democratic action, science and face-to-face interaction of Dewey, Mead, James
and Pierce also offers a reaffirmation of fundamental values which have always
been formative in the third sector itself and among researchers and scholars
interested in studying the sector.
The perspective of the commons as I have articulated it also seeks to take
emphasis off large, wealthy and powerful institutions and quasi-commercial
nonprofit firms as representative of the third sector as a whole. Instead, the
theory of the commons places its emphasis on participatory, collective, mutual
and expressive endeavors, which are often also smaller in scale and scope, in
control of fewer and more limited resources and generally capable of wielding
less social influence. To state the matter in terms of an organic analogy, the
theory of the commons seeks to locate the “heart and soul” of the third sector in
self-defining commons. The skeletal structure of the contemporary commons
may indeed be provided by the incorporation statutes, tax-policies and servicecontracting strategies of the welfare state. But the clearest expressions of the
pursuit of common goods are to be found in the community churches, self-help
and mutual aid groups, volunteer fire departments, hobby clubs, scientific
societies and many other clubs, groups, associations and societies. These are the
groups which determine for themselves the rules of participation and carry out
their own purposes, largely unaided by outsiders, using their own resources and
derive a satisfactory sense of mutuality in the process. These are also the types of
groups which the Supreme Court clearly had in mind in its landmark declaration
of a constitutional right of association in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama. (1958)
Such non-coerced, cooperative, mutual, shared fair-play in pursuit of selfdefined common goods is definitive in the third sector. It is this model of
common action which nonprofit law recognizes, and tax policy encourages. It is
this model of joint action which civics texts and politicians (in their better
moments) extol. It is such action which is often referred to as grass-roots and
community-based. Regrettably, the paradigmatic role of representing the third
sector has been to an important degree coopted by the giant foundations,
national association oligarchies and quasi-commercial nonprofit firms which so
frequently position themselves to speak in the name of the third sector today.

So What?
In formulating the theory of the commons, I chose to defer consideration of
questions of practice and policy until a basic outline of the nature of the
commons itself had been set out. This paper is an effort to re-engage the
practical issues earlier set aside.
In the past several years, several unrelated intellectual and practical
trends have been converging which set the backdrop for this current effort.
Of particular note has been the resurgence of interest in pragmatism among
American philosophers and the selective embrace of pragmatism and
interactional social science by Jürgen Habermas, the heir apparent of
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European critical theory (Geuss, 1981; Habermas, 1987). These matters are
explored extensively in a Fall, 1992 issue of Symbolic Interaction: The Official
Journal of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. More than
anything else, the American dialogues over Habermas have reopened broader
interest in the potentials of democratic organization and participation which
have long energized discussions within AVAS/ARNOVA of citizen and client
participation, volunteerism, collaboration, social democracy, co-production
and related matters.
Guided by such traditional and contemporary concerns, the objectives of a
suitable project to explore the policy and practice implications of the theory of
the commons can be summarized as follows:
- To recapture the radical democratic practice and policy implications
of Charles S. Pierce’s pragmatic model of scientific community and
John Dewey’s model of democratic community and apply them to
understanding of the commons;
- To operationalize the convergence of objectivist and relativist
perspectives which Richard Bernstein and others see in the critical
theory of Jürgen Habermas; (Bernstein, 1983)
- To move toward a vigorous, pragmatic critical theory which is also
non-Marxist, neo-Hegelian as the basis for fundamental social
criticism and social reconstruction;
- And ultimately to rediscover and embrace a vigorous model of civil
society consisting of an integrated community of emancipated and
enlightened citizens in unconstrained interaction and dialogue.
Pragmatic approaches to policy concerned with addressing this broad
middle ground will likely offer major alternatives to both the discredited
doctrines of state-socialism and the highly-fashionable but equally dubious
doctrines of anti-statist individualism, social Darwinism and laissez-faire
market economics which erupted back into political fashion in the 1980’s
after nearly a century of well-deserved neglect.

Social Policy and Practice Defined
An approach to policy as determining the ends of collective action in civil
society and practice as concern for the ways and means of attaining those ends
are fundamental to examination of the above objectives. Therefore, before we
can proceed further with any of these considerations, some clarification of the
key terms social policy and social practice from a pragmatic standpoint would be
in order.
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Social Policy
Nearly three decades ago the economist Kenneth Boulding defined social
policy in the following manner: “If there is one common thread that unites all
aspects of social policy and distinguishes them from merely economic policy, it is
the thread of what has elsewhere been called the ‘integrative system’. This
includes those aspects of social life that are characterized not so much by
exchange in which a quid is got from a quo as by unilateral transfers that are
justified by some kind of appeal to a status or legitimacy, identity or community.
The institutions with which social policy is especially concerned, such as the
school, family, church, or at the other end, the public assistance office, court,
prison, or criminal gang, all reflect degrees of integration and community. By
and large, it is the objective of social policy to build the identity of a person
around some community with which it is associated.” (Boulding, 1967.)
We can surmise that a concern with “building the identity of a person around
some community with which it is associated” offers at least an initial
approximation of the process which occurs more or less spontaneously in all
genuinely common action. This is also what several generations of social policy
architects have sought to capture and harness for some larger social good with
the Community Action Program, ACTION, Model Cities, the Older Americans
Act and numerous other public programs.
In the prevailing rationalist and positivist models of policy and practice
widely in vogue today, any concern of social policy for integration and the
furthering of community is usually translated into largely technical and
instrumental terms. Massive breakdowns of human communication and
understanding like the riots in Los Angeles surprise us even as their underlying
causes elude us. Rather than a common, mutual search for individual identity
and shared community, social policy has been reduced to an endless quest for
the most efficient and effective means to achieve pre-determined or fixed ends
projected to be beyond the reach of common debate or control.
Despite numerous critiques, the stream of rationalist instrumentalism runs
very deep and wide in contemporary social policy thinking. Even the venerable
British social policy analyst Richard Titmuss, fell victim to its influence in his
widely quoted definition of policy: “The word policy can be taken to refer to the
principles that govern action directed toward given ends.” (emphasis added)
(Titmuss, 1976, )
Such a view of social policy as principally concerned with spelling out the
means for attaining pre-determined or given ends is completely inconsistent with
the reality of much contemporary social legislation. What Robert Binstock calls
“new welfare” legislation is typically characterized by vague, general objectives
and impossibly broad and global intentions: eliminating poverty; cleaning up the
environment; ending family violence or rebuilding the cities. (Binstock, 1971,
personal communication) Interestingly, in many instances over the past three
decades, such sweeping policy objectives are declared by the state and then
subcontracted to nonprofit organizations for implementation. This may be, as is
often suggested, a massive buck-passing exercise on the part of timid, selfserving politicians. Even so, it is also a recognition of the norm-building and
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consensus generating capabilities of common action. Real commons are capable
of creating genuine, plausible, authentic ends and engaging in coordinated action
in pursuit of such common goods. This may involve the organization and
celebration of a community festival or a self-regulating science devoted to
knowledge building in a particular field, as well as groups and associations
devoted to defining, locating and solving all manner of community problems.
In any case, the ability of all types of nonprofit organizations, voluntary
associations and philanthropic endeavors to identify mutually acceptable ends in
a manner which reinforces and even increases levels of integration and solidarity
among members is one of the most interesting and fascinating aspects of the
commons. At the same time, one of the strongest points of pragmatic theory
has always been the ability to evaluate ends in terms of means and means in light
of ends which it offers.

The Grandstand View
Another related major issue in contemporary social policy is the tendency
to adopt the grandstand view of rational policy and practice models. This is
evident, for example, in the definition of social policy offered by David Gil.
“Social policies are principles or courses of action designed to influence the
overall quality of life in a society, the circumstances of living of individuals
and groups in that society, and the nature of intra-societal relationships
among individuals, groups and society as a whole.” (Gil, 1992.)
Yet, where are these privileged souls who stand apart from the society
they presume to judge, even as they seek to influence, even control? The
notion that anyone casting themselves in the role of a social policy analyst
can sit apart from and observe from some objective vantage point the “overall
quality of life of a society” as well as the full range of circumstances of living
and the relationships among members of that society is a clear expression of
such a grandstand view. The pragmatic view is quite something else: A view
of social policy analysis as one of a number of divergent, even competing,
streams of influence seeking to affect the ongoing conversation that is social
policy.
Social Practice
Any concern for social practice is at least partly a concern for deliberate
acts in which purpose, intent and direction are major issues. The social
practices associated with forming, operating and working within nonprofit
organization, voluntary action and philanthropy were once generally
interpreted from a pragmatic viewpoint which simultaneously emphasized
the micro-social view of intelligent group action and the macro-social view of
constructing democratic community life. More recently, however, many
social practice approaches on the third sector have been dominated by social
technology and “applied science” perspectives which place primary or
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exclusive preoccupation on the mastery of method and technique for attaining
fixed ends through the application of positive knowledge.
It is of interest, therefore, that one of Habermas’ most fundamental
criticisms of modern society involves the displacement of praxis in the sense
of action to further the good and just life, by techne, or the expert mastery of
objectified tasks (Bernstein, 1983). Such a technical view is entirely
consistent with a social work which places primary emphasis on the means
for attaining established ends, and which seeks to evaluate policy primarily
in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of attaining those ends. It is also
entirely consistent with a grandstand view of society which places the policy
analyst or advocate outside the flow of action.
Entirely consistent with models of social policy which emphasize means
over ends and the grandstand viewpoint of the policy analyst and developer is
the emerging positivistic model of social practice as “policy implementation.”
Another expression of this view is the often-heard notion of social practice as
“applied social science.” In both cases, social practice is conceived as a followup activity which proceeds from or develops out of research and/or policymaking in which the objective insights of research are applied to “the real
world”.
In many contemporary articulations of this view, the basic operations of
nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations and many practice
communities found in the third sector in the arts, social services, health care
and other fields are subjected to a kind of correspondence theory: The lived
experiences of those commons and the theoretical, conception and empirical
knowledge of those commons possessed by social scientists are fashioned as
the parallel universes of "theory" and "reality" in which research-based
theoretical knowledge can be directly, unproblematically and unequivocally
“applied” to future acts in what is usually termed “the real world.”
One of the most telling criticisms that can be leveled at contemporary
third sector perspectives is the relative absence (or perhaps the restricted
influence) of genuinely political perspectives in this rational-technical world
view. The profoundly political (or, civic) nature of nonprofit, voluntary and
philanthropic decision and action is either ignored entirely, or treated as one,
among many competing paradigms.

Policy, Practice and Intelligence

In contrast to other perspectives, including traditional critical theory,
pragmatic perspectives on policy and practice in the commons downplay the
importance of rational decisions, particularly as defined by the rational
method, and substitute instead the importance of rational as well as the
irrational considerations including ethics, emotions, intuition and aesthetics.
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“The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is
to project new and more complex ends -- to free experience from routine and
caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given in the
mechanism of the body or in the extant state of society but the use of
intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.”
(Dewey, 1917, p. 63f)
In contemporary social policy discussions, various efforts have come close
to capturing the essential characteristics of the pragmatic theory of
intelligence within the technical language of policy analysis. Charles
Lindblom’s models of “disjointed incrementalism” or “muddling through” and
“strategic analysis” capture the essential pragmatic qualities of precedent,
process and context implicit in Dewey’s and other pragmatic viewpoints.
Herbert Simon’s emphasis on rational decision-making under conditions of
partial and insufficient information and the perspectival limits implicit in the
concept of “satisficing” are also largely consistent with the viewpoint of
Dewey and his colleague George Herbert Mead of intelligence grounded
concretely in social life.
Richard Bernstein, in particular, has been forthright in proclaiming the
emergence of “a new sensibility and universe of discourse. . . which sought to
interpret dialectically the empirical, interpretive and critical dimensions of a
theoretical orientation that is directed toward practical activity.” (Bernstein,
1983, p. x; Bernstein, 1976) Bernstein’s (1983) argument, as well as his title,
characterizes this emergent paradigm as a movement Beyond Objectivism
and Relativism. A principal inspiration for The Commons (Lohmann, 1992)
was Bernstein’s view of a growing convergence of Marxian-Hegelian critical
theory with American pragmatism and British-American analytical
philosophy in the work of Jurgen Habermas. This viewpoint was reinforced
(and the draft of this paper considerably delayed) by the recent publication of
a special issue of Symbolic Interaction, devoted entirely to examination of
convergences in Habermas’ work between critical theory and pragmatism.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to exploring the implications of some
of those themes for social policy and practice in the commons.

Critical Theory
My interest here is less in applying European critical theory, ala
Habermas, to the study of the commons than in exploring the implications
and potentials of the pragmatic critical theory which has been unearthed by
Habermas’ approach. What Habermas’ does is bring into “sharp focus the
critical dimension of pragmatism, its interest in emancipation, freedom of
communications and equalization of participatory rights.” (Joas, 1992, p. ?)
Please note that these are precisely the values which have traditionally
energized the "voluntary action" tradition to which the theory of the commons
is most responsive.
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Many of the concepts found scattered throughout Habermas’ work,
appear to be fraught with interesting implications for the policy and practice
of nonprofit organization, voluntary action and philanthropy. However, the
overall goals of critical theory -- emancipation and enlightenment--are
particularly relevant in the context of the commons. That is, provided they
can be meaningfully transliterated out of the Hegelian context and into the
pragmatic world of daily life in the commons; a task which Habermas has
already begun. (It is interesting to note also that Habermas' use of the
pragmatists is the latest chapter in an on-going trans-Atlantic dialogue.
Both John Dewey and George Herbert Mead studied in Germany in the late
19th century, and Dewey in particular acknowledged his indebtedness to
Hegel.)
In moving critical theory beyond conventional Marxism and Freudianism
and by embracing the American pragmatic tradition, Habermas has helped
to clarify that critical theory is not the monopoly of European Marxians and
Hegelians. Critical theory, as a concern for emancipation through critique
might be more accurately rendered in English as “expanding social, political
and economic freedom through social criticism”. As such, it is a longstanding component of pragmatism. Indeed, American social thinkers
working in and near the pragmatic tradition from Jane Addams, John Dewey
and Thorsten Veblen to C. Wright Mills, as well as their predecessors from
Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson, have established venerable
American traditions of social criticism. In this context, the popular image of
Dewey, Mead and the other pragmatists as status-quo oriented consensus
seekers is seriously wide of the mark, as numerous commentators have noted.
Even more relevant to our purpose are the traditional roles of criticism by
the third sector. Foundations, non-profit community protest groups, reform,
abolition and counter-culture societies, and many other types of commons
have long been the point of origin of such critiques. Indeed, it is almost an
axiom of American democracy that changes in governmental social policy
almost always originate with some type of group or association outside of
government in the “third sector”. Thus, at least from the time of the
Protestant Reformation and probably earlier as well, commons have served
as a principal locus for fundamental social criticism.
Critical theory, however, is according to its adherents more than a
sociology of social problems. (Geuss, 1982) According to the critical theorists,
critique, in order to be considered effective, must be a prelude to liberation
and enlightenment. The first is generally presented as release from
oppressive social and political conditions. This is largely the domain of social
policy from the vantage point of pragmatic critical theory, although there are
also important practice implications to this as well. Particularly in the
context of the vexing problems of institutional racism, gender politics and the
growing body of special interests alleging a wide variety of privileged claims
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on the public good, the possibilities of utilizing the potential for liberation to
critically evaluate such claims ought to be taken seriously. Indeed, there
may be no more succinct way of understanding the legitimate demands of
African-Americans for an end to racism and for the legitimate demands of
women for full equality and social participation. A vigorous pragmatic
conception of liberation, however, would need to be stripped of the polemical
cant of vulgar Marxism in which it is often wrapped on American campuses
today. When liberation in a pragmatic guise, for example, is removed from
the Hegelian trappings of false consciousness, Geist and the labor theory of
value, and evaluated directly in terms of the consequences of oppressive
social and political conditions on the lives of the oppressed and their
oppressors, it has the potential to both complement and extends existing lines
of social problems inquiry.
According to the critical theorists, enlightenment is a matter of improved
self-awareness and more accurate perception or consciousness of one’s actual
circumstances together with full acceptance of those conditions. This is the
proper domain of practice, although there are obvious policy implications to
this as well. This is the point, in particular, where we may feel bogged down
in the heavy burdens of Hegelian metaphysics and begin to feel oppressed by
such Germanic neologisms as the distinction of different forms of power (e.g.,
Macht and Herrschaft).
Perhaps most interesting of all the potential implications which might
arise from a pragmatic critical theory applied to the commons is the linkages
which Habermas is pointing toward between the macro-social level of
institutions and the social order and the micro-social worlds of everyday life
and interaction. It is precisely in this domain in-between where the
“intermediate” institutions of the commons are most likely to be found. Yet,
this is one of the most difficult points to encounter today, in a world where
social policy is most often regarded as the program or ideology justifying or
explaining social structure and practice is viewed as concerned only with
means of attaining sacrosanct ends.
According to Shalin (1992, 255), Habermas “pins his hopes for
emancipation on the fact that the ossified social order can be deciphered and
transcended on the micro-level, in routine symbolic interactions, where
oppressive structures are reproduced in the structures of interpersonal
communication.” Critical theory thus points to potential major linkages
between the “micro-social” levels of interpersonal communication. Moreover,
it is one in which the clubs, associations and other commons of civil society
have traditionally figured large.
Habermas spurs us to recall that Dewey was foremost among the
pragmatists in articulating a political edge to what is often misconstrued as
pragmatism as an apolitical set of doctrines. As constructed by Dewey, the
political program of pragmatism places central importance on democracy and
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the political role of the common good. Dewey’s political program began in the
pragmatic observation that non-state processes of collective (that is, common)
action encounter problems and experience unanticipated or unintended
consequences which the acting collective then has to process reflexively.
(Joas, 1993, 268)
Habermas also helps us to recall that in the pragmatic political view, the
methods of intelligent action in science and politics are inextricably related.
In the Deweyian view, the conditions of acquiring scientific knowledge are
essentially the same as the conditions for establishing democratic
community.

Conclusion
The underlying social policy imperative of the theory of the commons
should be seen as nothing less than a renaissance of the Deweyian objective
of recreating the endangered democratic public sphere by revitalizing
community life. This is what citizen participation and community
development and coproduction are (or should be) all about. Before the
emancipatory and enlightening objectives of critical theory can be genuinely
understood and applied to policy and practice in the context of the American
commons, however, it must be translated fully out of the Marxian-Hegelian
perspective in which it arose, and into the pragmatic context. The
fundamental dynamic can be cast as an on-going dialogue: Habermas, the
German social critic, has a great deal of interest to say in his restatement of
critical theory under the influence of the American pragmatists. However, in
order for full understanding of the import of Habermas' message to be applied
to policy and practice in the commons, that message must be translated back
into the American social and cultural context out of which pragmatism
originally arose.
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